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ARTICLE
Control not morality? Explaining the selective employment of




This article reveals for the ﬁrst time why a Nazi war criminal named Günter
Ebeling who was employed by the American Counter Intelligence Corps
(CIC) in occupied Germany was violently killed by British intelligence
oﬃcers. Through analysis of hitherto unpublished Intelligence Division
documents, it argues that existing debates concerning the post-war
employment of Nazi war criminals in occupied Germany have been
framed in the wrong light. Discussions concerning security and control,
not morality, usually surrounded disputes regarding the employment of
Nazis. Close and comparative analysis of Ebeling’s recruitment and ‘dis-
missal’ with that of several other Nazis demonstrates that hindsight,
source limitations and a prevalent case study approach have prevented
the identiﬁcation of common reasoning concerning security and control
which surrounded the post-war employment of war criminals in several
areas of intelligence work. Indeed, new evidence suggests that the British
and American intelligence services employed some Nazi war criminals in
post-war Germany as part of a wider strategy of control designed to
ensure the security of the occupation and pave the way for a future
democratic Germany. Through the analytical prism of security and control,
this article provides a synthesis between a multitude of case studies.
At a War Oﬃce meeting in January 1947, the Chief of the British Intelligence Division (ID), Major-General
John Sydney ‘Tubby’ Lethbridge told the Director of Military Intelligence, Major-General Gerald Templer
of a ‘unique and extremely melodramatic episode’ about which ‘very few oﬃcers’ knew ‘the full story’.1
This top secret information, told in Lethbridge’s ownwords, can be found in a letter, tucked away near the
back of a large ForeignOﬃce folder concerning the infamous Bad Nenndorf detailed interrogation centre
which was the subject of a torture scandal.2 Its contents, published here in unprecedented detail, are
crucial to explaining the selective employment of Nazi war criminals by Anglo-American intelligence
agencies in occupied Germany. Lethbridge’s letter also describes the death of an important Nazi war
criminal-cum-American intelligence agent whose fate has hitherto remained a mystery to some experts
and has never been fully explored or explained by historians.3 It describes the following incident:
At a safe house in Hamburg, on the evening of 18 January 1947, three British intelligence oﬃcers
came face to face with a Nazi war criminal named Günter Ebeling.4 During the Second World War, he
had been ‘the Commander of an “Annihilation Squad” of the S.S. in Warsaw’.5 But, in 1947, he was
employed by the American Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) and known to the British and American
intelligence services by his alias, Slim.6 He had ﬁrst been employed by the CIC in 1945 when his
services directly contributed to the successful completion of Operation Nursery.7 This operation
involved the rounding up of a Nazi underground movement led by Artur Axmann, the head of the
Hitler Youth.8 Since then, Slim had been helping the CIC to inﬁltrate other post-war Nazi
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movements.9 It was one of these missions which had brought him, along with a drunken CIC oﬃcer
named Ludwell, to Hamburg.10
At this time, the British knew Slim was a war criminal.11 Perhaps this is why they advised one of their
own intelligence oﬃcers, Mr. Coleman, to ‘drop’ his personal friendship with him which had formed
during Operation Nursery.12 Nevertheless, the British ID had been using Slim, in coordination with their
American colleagues, in an anti-Nazi operation codenamed ‘Jersey Cow’ which would later develop
into the better-known Operation Selection Board.13 But, Slim’s rendezvous on January 18th was a
trap.14 The three ID oﬃcers had been ordered to arrest him.15 The order had come from the Chief
himself, Major-General Lethbridge, who was acting on a request from his American colleague.16 When
Slim, whowas ‘an extremely powerful man, standing 6ʹ6” high and broad in proportion’ realised hewas
under arrest, he:
. . . fought all three British Intelligence oﬃcers with his bare hands for over half an hour. The British Intelligence
oﬃcers had been ordered to take him alive, and did not in consequence use their pistols, except to try to
overawe him. This however, had no eﬀect, and one oﬃcer shot “Slim” through the foot early on in the fracas. This
had no apparent eﬀect on the man, who was by now “berserk”. The three Intelligence oﬃcers then tried to
chloroform him but without success. Finally, after a severe struggle one of them hit “Slim” over the head with a
loaded stick and knocked him unconscious. “Slim” and Ludwell were then placed in two waiting cars, and driven
to Bad Nenndorf, where they were to be held pending advice from the Americans as to their disposal . . . “Slim”
remained unconscious throughout [the journey] and on arrival at D.I.C. it was found that he was dead.17
American intelligence were petriﬁed of the public ﬁnding out that they had employed a Nazi who
‘was wanted by the Polish Government, as a major war criminal’.18 Moreover, Coleman had been
threatened by the ‘ringleaders of “Selection Board” that he and his family would be killed if any harm
came to “Slim” or if their organisation was “betrayed”’.19 Consequently, Lethbridge had Coleman, his
wife and four children taken home and removed from service in Germany.20 Slim was given a funeral
‘with some pomp’.21 Local townspeople were told that he was a British intelligence oﬃcer who had
succumb to ‘a highly infectious disease’.22 Even the local mayor ‘was co-operative to the extent of
providing a quantity of Lysol at the grave’.23 Saluting shots were ﬁred and wreathes were laid.24
Slim’s body was buried beneath a wooden cross marked with the name John X White.25 Perhaps his
remains are still there.26
How can historians explain this? A Nazi war criminal had been employed by American intelligence
to arrest other Nazi war criminals. This makes little sense in moral terms. However, much of the existing
literature surrounding the Allied employment of war criminals has, understandably, analysed such
issues as a moral conundrum. In 1985, Linda Hunt concluded her article on the American recruitment
of Nazi scientists as part of Operation Paperclip with a call for further research ‘ . . . in the interest of
salvaging justice and the United States’ morality’.27 To Hunt, the scientiﬁc achievements aided by
Paperclip were ‘accomplished at great moral cost’.28 Almost twenty years later, Michael Salter rightly
complained in the Journal of Intelligence History that many publications concerning the recruitment of
Nazi war criminals still consisted of ‘investigative journalism and a stream of “exposé” style books’
which tended to be ‘one-sided’ in their negative portrayal of the recruiting intelligence services.29 In
the historiography of war criminal recruitment, much attention has been devoted to explaining exactly
what happened, and the extent of it, rather than why.30 This search for numbers can also be
interpreted at least partially as a moral enquiry with the implication that the greater the amount of
war criminals employed by the intelligence services, the more they can be condemned as immoral.
Popular interest in such post-war Nazi recruitment remains high as in 2018, newspapers around the
world published articles discussing how Heinrich Himmler’s daughter, Gudrun Burwitz, had been
employed by the German foreign intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND).31
A notable exception to the exposé publications loathed by Salter is David Cesarani’s inﬂuential
and valuable book Justice Delayed. Published in 1992, this book scrutinises the European Voluntary
Worker schemes which brought ‘at least 10,000 former Waﬀen-SS soldiers’ to Britain.32 When
discussing intelligence recruitment, Cesarani focuses overwhelmingly on anti-communism as a
motivation for employing ‘ex’ Nazis.33 He was limited in his analysis by the classiﬁcation of ﬁles
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which made it diﬃcult for him at times to relate his arguments to the wider activities and policies of
the British intelligence services.34 Nevertheless, Cesarani is partially correct to conclude that ‘the
revulsion felt for the Waﬀen-SS’ was ‘tempered by a pragmatic sense that war criminals . . . could
prove useful in the new struggle to ensure British security’.35 But contrary to the impression given by
Cesarani, the struggle for security was not just a struggle against communism, but also one against
Nazism, as this article will make clear. Nor was this struggle solely conﬁned to British security,
because it encompassed West German security, too. Moreover, the closely related struggle for
control, which most clearly links war criminal recruitment to the wider aims of occupation, is notably
absent in Cesarani’s analysis.
Since Salter’s call for more balance, several publications have explored the positive role which the
British and American intelligence services played in destroying Nazi underground movements in
post-war Germany.36 However, some recent publications which focus solely on the recruitment of
war criminals, although more analytical, are still vexed by moral issues.37 Moreover, most articles and
books concerning war criminal recruitment are case studies, focusing on a particular nation and/or
intelligence service.38 For example, two of the most recent studies by Stephen Tyas andMichael Wala
focus on MI6 and the CIA respectively.39 But for years, the understudied British and American
Intelligence Divisions were the principle intelligence organisations operating in Germany. MI6 and
the CIA had to coordinate many of their activities with them.40 Understanding of both ID’s has
hitherto been hampered in the existing historiography by the classiﬁcation of ﬁles, their oﬃcially
organised mass destruction and their poor archival labelling.41 The lengthiest discussion of the
British ID in the historiography is Paul Maddrell’s Spying on Science. Drawing on documents produced
largely by the ID’s Scientiﬁc and Technical Intelligence Branch (STIB), Maddrell, like Cesarani,
emphasises the need to deny the Soviets scientiﬁc and technical knowledge as a key, if not the
key, motive behind the employment of Nazi scientists by the Western intelligence services.42
Very few publications analyse both British and American recruitment practices together in
detail, despite the fact that war criminal recruits were involved in joint operations such as
Selection Board and Nursery. A useful joint analysis was recently published by Wala.43 But, he
focuses predominantly on anti-communism as a reason for such recruitment, as does Cesarani,
Maddrell and most other historians who have studied this topic in detail.44 The fact that the Allied
intelligence services were initially recruiting some Nazi war criminals to use against Nazi under-
ground groups has received little attention, although it is important for understanding later
recruitment practices. Another drawback of the prevalent case study approach and the focus on
communism has been a lack of synthesis when discussing diﬀerent types of intelligence work. For
example, Thomas Boghardt does not discuss Operation Rusty or Operation Paperclip because he
believes ‘the recruitment of Nazi informants constitutes a signiﬁcant and distinct aspect of Army
intelligence operations in the early Cold War’.45
The recruitment of Nazi informants was indeed signiﬁcant. But this article argues that some
common reasoning concerning security and control surrounded the recruitment of ‘ex’ Nazi scien-
tists and the recruitment of war criminals. Operation Rusty, too, was subject to the same thinking
concerning security and control as was the ad-hoc recruitment of Nazi informants. This can be
revealed through a detailed analysis of a broad selection of British and American Intelligence
Division documents. Scrutiny of these records will enable this article to further argue that, in contrast
to some evidence analysed by Boghardt, moral disputes were almost entirely absent when discuss-
ing the employment of Nazi war criminals, but the language of control was constantly explicit.46
However, as will be further demonstrated, moral considerations were always implicit as one of the
main reasons why the Intelligence Divisions employed Nazis was to help accomplish their missions of
securing their occupation zones and helping to rebuild a democratic Germany by controlling and
dividing far right movements and denying agents to the Soviets. On ﬁrst consideration, the recruit-
ment of Nazi war criminals by British and American intelligence organisations appears to jar with two
important shared aims of the Allied occupation, outlined at the Yalta (4th-11 February 1945) and
Potsdam (17th July-2 August 1945) conferences, denaziﬁcation and democratisation.47 To achieve
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them, the Allies needed to establish ﬁrm control of the German population and ensure the security of
their occupation zones. British and American intelligence organisations were vital to establishing
such control and ensuring that security. They also actively pursued democratisation and various
forms of denaziﬁcation.48 However, British and American intelligence oﬃcers who worked with Nazi
war criminals viewed selective recruitment of the latter as an eﬀective way of achieving these aims,
although ID methods did not always accord with those of military government, as will be seen.
But even the conclusions drawn here must only be tentative as many Intelligence Division ﬁles
have been destroyed.49 Moreover, the American ID directed CIC detachments in Germany did not
maintain ‘A central record of CIC controlled informants’.50 These factors all make it diﬃcult to identify
the reasons behind and the circumstances surrounding the employment of Nazi war criminals in
post-war Germany. But by analysing ﬁles concerning war criminals alongside those concerning the
employment of Nazis in general in several areas of intelligence work, those concerning their
dismissal and ID attitudes towards Nazism, this article will place the recruitment of war criminals
into an important broader context, enabling general conclusions to be drawn that are more ﬁtting
with the context of the time and less inﬂuenced by the shock of revelation and resulting exposé
publications that surround this subject, or hindsight concerning the Cold War.
The employment, arrest and death of Slim is central to the argument of this article. However, his
case is unusual due to its bloody conclusion and the amount of evidence preserved concerning it.
For example, a CIC memorandum produced to ‘help analyse the intention of the informant [Slim]’ is
still stored in the American national archives.51 This memorandum, dated 1946, reveals that the CIC
may not have been aware that Slim was a war criminal at the time of his employment. Indeed, it
appears to accept at face value Slim’s statement that he was ‘not under automatic arrest category’
and his personal criticisms of the atrocities committed by the SS.52 The CIC also seemed satisﬁed with
Slim’s explanation for switching sides. He believed that ‘if all the wanted people are turned in and all
underground movements are destroyed, the occupational forces will leave Germany, thus enabling
Germany to regain self-rule’.53 As he was unable to convince Axmann of this strategy, he decided to
help the CIC.54 Still, Slim’s closeness to high ranking Nazis must have caused some discomfort
amongst the CIC as he eerily felt compelled to remind them: ‘“One loves the information and not
the informant”’.55 However, according to Lethbridge, the Americans were aware at the time of Slim’s
employment that he was wanted for war crimes in Poland. As Lethbridge explained: ‘In spite of this
the Americans decided to employ him under his alias “Slim”, as a regular agent in their Counter
Intelligence Corps. In so doing, they were of course taking a tremendous “chance”. Nevertheless,
they decided to use him as a regular agent, to penetrate further German subversive organisations’.56
The fact that Lethbridge considered the employment of wanted men such as Slim to be a
‘tremendous chance’ suggests that the employment of war criminals was not the norm in post-
war Germany. Moreover, the decision to employ such characters was not taken lightly, and the
intelligence services were aware of the risks. So why was Slim employed? Evidence suggests that the
CIC believed he was crucial to the successful completion of Operation Nursery and the breaking up of
other Nazi underground organisations.57 This turned out to be true, as Slim’s personal contact with
Axmann proved essential for orchestrating the latter’s arrest, which Slim helped plan and was key to
carrying out.58 But what is more revealing than the reasons for his employment is the reason for his
dismissal and resulting death. Indeed, it was not the knowledge of Slim’s war crimes which resulted
in the CIC’s change of heart but rather:
. . . the American authorities (General Burress) demanded the arrest of “Slim” and Ludwell, because they believed
that (a) “Slim” was “double crossing” them and (b) Ludwell’s nerve had apparently broken. (Ludwell had been
continuously drunk ever since he had entered our Zone). They feared that Ludwell was now completely under
“Slim’s” inﬂuence and power, and they were anxious lest the penetration of the subversive movements should
fail. In particular General Burress was apprehensive that “Slim” would “double cross” the U.S. Intelligence service
by disclosing to the ringleaders of “Mayﬂy” and/or “Jersey Cow”, the names of the American agents which were
known to him. He was also worried at the amount of knowledge that “Slim” possessed of the American
Intelligence service.59
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In other words, Slim could no longer be controlled and had become a security risk. As this evidence
suggests, the ability to control and issues concerning security, much more than moral considera-
tions, were key factors for both British and American intelligence when deciding which Nazis to
employ and which Nazis to arrest in post-war Germany. Further evidence of this can be found
through analysis of general intelligence assessments concerning extreme political movements. For
example, a 1947 American military intelligence report concerning the ‘Present Status of the Nazi
Threat’ made clear that in aiming to establish an enduring democratic system in Germany (or, ‘in
giving the Germans some rather intensive, on-the-job training in Democracy’), the Americans were
ﬁghting two wars at once, one against the far left and another against the far right.60 Remarkably,
when explaining why American intelligence did not simply use all Nazis to ﬁght communists, the
report framed its response by primarily addressing issues of control, almost completely ignoring the
moral implications of the question:
This brings us to a ﬁnal line of reasoning frequently brought up in this connection. That is that if we are as
aware as we claim to be of the menace of Communism, particularly as backed by a sullen and dynamic Russia,
why all this hue and cry over the Nazis? Why not conserve this one residually anti-communistic element as a
counterweight to the greater evil? For this answer one need only look back to 1939. The lessons of the great
change of front have great bearing on the problem in hand. In the ﬁrst place, an opportunistic, totalitarian
movement has complete freedom of doctrine and position, so cannot be relied on. In the second place, one
can only prevent such changes of front on the part of such an organization if one stays strong enough to
control it [Emphasis added]. Lastly, if one is that strong he does not need such an organization anyway and is
much better oﬀ without it.61
Of course, the desire to introduce lasting democracy to Germany can be viewed as a long-term
morally justiﬁable goal, but in the short term, attitudes towards Nazis and Nazism were addressed
through the prism of control and security, as the report concluded:
To sum up, we see that the former Nazi movement as deﬁned above, though now completely broken and
disorganized, must still be closely watched until democratic processes and the necessary material well-being to
insure their permanence are ﬁrmly established. For until then this movement if not controlled still has the
dangerous potential capability of weakening democratic growth and thereby, whether involuntarily, or not,
paving the way for Communism [Emphasis added].62
The latter comment hints at a constant fear of both intelligence services in post-war Germany, that
far-right neo-Nazi groups would merge to become a powerful singular force (reorganise) or that
Nazis would join forces with communists to destabilise the occupation and achieve a totalitarian
form of German uniﬁcation, purposefully or not.63 Such fears were not unfounded as some oppor-
tunistic Nazis (Slim included) threatened to work for the Russians and others did in fact work for
them.64
But the Nazis who were viewed as the biggest threat to the occupation were those still actively
engaged in extreme politics or military groups. As the British press release following Operation
Selection Board (the rounding up of an underground Nazi movement and associated Nazis)
stated:
These are desperate characters who have no hope for the future in any decent democratic society. They will
clutch at any chance, however slender and however dangerous, to re-establish the days in which they ﬂourished
. . . Some of the leaders are war criminals who are wanted for crimes against humanity by one or more of the
United Nations.65
A similar statement ﬁled alongside the above further explains that those individuals who started
subversive groups were seen to:
. . . have no hope for a decent life in the future of Germany because they were leaders and fanatics of the Nazi
Party . . . These persons are, in many cases, clever, intelligent leaders who are capable of attracting a following
from the multitude of former Nazis now either imprisoned or undergoing other punishment . . . .66
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They therefore had the potential to become:
. . . leaders and dictators of a new Germany, equally as dangerous to a democratic world as the Germany of Hitler
. . . To prevent this type of individual from gaining any position where he might become a threat to the
occupation or to a new democratic Germany, agents of the Army intelligence system have maintained
unrelenting eﬀorts to discover, observe and destroy such activity.67
War criminals alone, then, were not the most dangerous and sought-after targets of the Allied
intelligence services in later 1940s Germany. But rather, ‘clever, intelligent’ Nazi ideologue leaders
who had no hope for any peaceful alternative occupation in the new democratic Germany which
Anglo-American intelligence were helping to build. If a war criminal expressed disbelief in or at least
refrained from extreme politics and oﬀered his services to the Allies, they could be used to ﬁght the
continuing underground Nazi political movements which were, after the violent Werwolf style
resistance petered out, perceived to be one of the most serious threats to lasting democracy in
Germany.68 In summary, war criminals guilty of murder were, in some instances, not perceived to be
as dangerous as those capable of giving them murderous orders and inspiring people to follow
them.
The ID’s distinction between war criminals who could and could not be controlled, partially on the
basis of present commitment to ideology, leadership skills and intelligence did not concur with the
overt system of denaziﬁcation which sought to categorise Nazis in terms of the positions they held in
and their actions during the Third Reich in order to determine their level of guilt, punish them and
remove them from positions of public inﬂuence.69 Unsurprisingly then, many intelligence oﬃcers
were critical of the overt denaziﬁcation process. For example, a British ID report argued in 1946 that
‘Denaziﬁcation has been the cause of more muddled thinking than any other aspect of Allied policy
in Germany’.70 Moreover, a British Intelligence Bureau report stated in December 1945 when
discussing how to identify a ‘nominal’ Nazi that ‘labels are far from everything . . . .in the aﬃliated
organisations rank is not a sure guide to enthusiasm’.71 It also warned that even Germans who had
not been members of the NSDAP could be dangerous and therefore also needed ‘watching’.72
Interestingly, this report, which featured a rare mention of morality in its title (Moral Disarmament)
drew a distinction between denaziﬁcation and the ‘control of Germans collectively and individually
to prevent their warlike association’, though both were viewed as part of the same overall task.73
Importantly, again, owing to its comments on the inadequacies of label-based denaziﬁcation, this
report arguably favoured the ‘control of Germans collectively and individually’ over denaziﬁcation,
though it did agree both were necessary. In light of such evidence, Perry Biddiscombe’s statement
that the ID were ‘relatively strident denaziﬁers’, in the sense of military government policy, needs to
be reconsidered.74
British Air Force Intelligence in Germany went further in its criticisms of denaziﬁcation, stating
(with a probable bias for its own specialist area of focus): ‘It is all very well to go witch hunting after
Nazis, but the really dangerous individuals in Germany are those with the military knowledge
requisite for reconstituting Germany’s air power’.75 Again, they viewed this particular danger
through the prism of control:
In view of European developments the problem of “control” would seem to fall into two phases: (1)
Administrative control of key German Air Force personnel in the Western zone, and, (2) Preventive or protective
control (i.e. the supervision of important German Air Force personnel to prevent their escape into, or utilisation
within the Eastern zone.76
The report continues to express fear that such individuals may try and stir up an ‘East-West conﬂict’
and revealingly suggests that their movements throughout Germany should be monitored.77
Moreover, it worried that if Luftwaﬀe records fell into the wrong hands, then ‘an aggressor could
use them to control his German assistants’ or ‘the Germans could use them to re-organise
themselves’.78
As the above evidence suggests, concerns about security and control, rather than morality,
were much more prominently expressed when it came to dealing with Nazis for the British
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intelligence services. Also prominent in the above statements was fear of German reorganisation,
a merging of extreme movements, or ‘warlike association’. In light of this, it could be argued that
the employment of Nazi war criminals as intelligence agents was part of a wider strategy of
divide and rule. This broad idea is alluded to in some documents from the early occupation
period. For example, in 1945, a letter from ‘Mr. Kirkpatrick’ suggested to the Foreign Oﬃce ‘that it
should be our policy to split the Germans into as many groups, religious and political, as
possible’.79 Using Nazi war criminals such as Slim against other war criminals involved in Nazi
underground groups and arresting them before they could merge, could be viewed as part of
this strategy. Clearly, for the British and American Intelligence Divisions, one of the best methods
of controlling Nazi war criminals and reducing the security threat which they posed, was to
recruit some of them.
But Anglo-American intelligence were aware that not all of the ‘ex’ Nazis who worked for them in
post-war Germany would genuinely dispel their earlier Nazi convictions. For example, in October
1945, a British 21st Army Group report worried that one ‘Doctor Walther . . . one of the German arch
exponents of jet propulsion’ was working ‘under British Naval supervision’ at Kiel.80 Although he was
‘co-operative in this work, he remains a professed Nazi’.81 He was just one of ‘many examples of such
individuals’.82 The ‘only solution’ foreseen by this report was to deport such scientists from Germany
to ensure they could not work together against Allied interests in secret.83 This suggestion could
again be viewed as another example of divide and rule via the control of movements. But other
intelligence oﬃcers, evidently in the majority, did not see the recruitment of Nazi scientists as much
of an issue as their Nazi convictions did not seem to make their purely scientiﬁc work any more
dangerous, especially when it was conducted under close British or American observation. For
example, Brigadier Spedding believed the 21st Army Group report was ‘exaggerated’ and argued
that ‘If these men were Nazis they would be dealt with under that heading, but he did not think they
constituted a danger as scientists’.84 Importantly, those that were believed to be potentially danger-
ous were to be ‘kept under surveillance’.85
Surveillance was not the only method of control which the British and American intelligence
services could impose on scientists in Germany. Working under British or American control meant
that Nazi scientists could, if so desired, be split up to ensure that they did not work together in any
negative way as 21st Army Group worried they might. Indeed, the British expressed a constant desire
‘to place them in non-war potential work where their interests will develop along peaceful lines’.86
The desire to prevent certain scientists from working with potentially dangerous colleagues on
dangerous projects, or, as Paul Maddrell points out, to prevent them fromworking for the Soviets, ﬁts
in well with the earlier discussed examples which expressed the need for a general divide and rule
approach towards Germany and the need to control certain Germans lest another power, hostile to
British interests, control them instead.87 Importantly, when some doubts were raised as to whether
the manpower allotted to the Scientiﬁc and Technical Intelligence Branch of the British ID should
come from the Control Commission and not the Ministry of Defence (which beneﬁtted most from its
work), the response again focused on issues of control: ‘The collection of Scientiﬁc and Technical
Intelligence has been accepted as a part of the work of controlling Germany, and it is immaterial
what Department gets the beneﬁt of it’.88 Clearly, the employment of Nazi scientists was viewed and
justiﬁed as part of a wider strategy of control.
But if the British and American intelligence services were recruiting Nazi war criminals and
unrepentant Nazi ideologues as part of a wider strategy of control, how did they identify which
war criminals could be controlled and what methods did they utilise to ensure that such characters in
their employ remained under their control? As Lethbridge stated, in defence of British recruitment
techniques:
Could it perhaps be pointed out to Manpower Division that in insisting on the application of their ordinary rules
“without fear or favour” they are taking a singularly unrealistic and very short-term view? I do not think I am
being too cynical in submitting that in these trying times we will not attach reliable German services to us by
ideology alone.89
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Using ‘fear or favour’ to control and/or recruit informants was a strategy employed by Lethbridge’s
American colleagues too. They called it a ‘hold’. For example, in 1946, questions were raised as to
why the CIC had employed a journalist namedMrs. Hildegard R. Springer (Agent Honeypot, Figure 1),
who had worked for the Nazi foreign oﬃce and was married to a former SS oﬃcer, to collect political
intelligence concerning the KPD and other targets as part of Operation Honeypot.90 In response, the
CIC stated that they were ‘aware of her background at the time she was picked up for use as an
informant’ but that ‘All informants employed by this organization are checked for reliability, insofar
as possible. Their background is investigated and in practically all cases some type of hold is
exercised over the informant’.91 In other words, Mrs. Springer’s Nazi background was not much of
an issue, as long as she remained under control and she would likely remain so due to the ‘hold’
which was probably placed on her.
Another method of control utilised by Anglo-American intelligence on their informants and
indeed on all security suspects, was the control of movements and communications. Because
censorship in occupied Germany was extensive, the intelligence services could keep a particularly
close watch on the communications of their employees. For example, in 1952, the American
Intelligence Division were alerted to the fact that ‘a former Paperclip specialist’ was committing
‘postal violations’.92 Moreover, the Anglo-American Combined Travel Board (CTB) often referred to a
shared ‘Travel Restriction List’ (TRL) in order to restrict the movements of individuals within Germany.
An analysis of correspondence between the Intelligence Divisions and the CTB reveals again that
issues of security and control, not morality, were paramount when considering which Germans
should have their movements restricted. For example, on 3 April 1951, Alfred Hermann Michahelles
was placed on the TRL as his name was found ‘in the address book of Fritz Wiedemann, former aide-
de-camp to Adolf Hitler . . . ’ and he was suspected of being involved in Nazi espionage.93 However, at
Figure 1. This grainy photograph shows Agent Honeypot (Hildegard Springer) on a political intelligence mission in 1946
(NARA II, RG 319, ZZ6, Box 13).
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the end of the month, a former Nazi party member suspected of espionage was not placed on the
TRL due to insuﬃcient evidence and in December a former ‘ardent Nazi oﬃcer’, Hans Ruperti, was
allowed to travel unrestricted.94 At other times, unevaluated British claims of being a ‘militant
commie’ could result in some individuals being placed on the TRL.95 Again, such distinctions make
little sense in moral terms. They do make sense, however, if one acknowledges that considerations of
security and control, rather than morality, were paramount when it came to dealing with the far left,
the far right and Nazi war criminals in post-war Germany. Indeed, these issues are best analysed
under the broad heading of ‘security’, as they were by the intelligence oﬃcers dealing with them at
the time.
As the above evidence suggests, Nazi war criminals, and individuals with Nazi pasts, were only
employed when it was believed that they could be eﬃciently controlled. But perhaps more
revealing than the reasons for their employment are the reasons for their dismissal. The British
and American Intelligence Divisions often kept each other informed when agents had to be
dropped in order to ensure that the services of the same, potentially damaging individuals,
would not be utilised twice. An analysis of these documents again demonstrates that issues of
security and control arguably always surrounded the employment of ‘ex’ Nazis. In January 1952,
the American ID informed the British Liaison Oﬃcer at HQ EUCOM that one Herbert Edler, who had
served in the German Army on the Eastern Front before ﬁnding employment with a ‘US agency’
had been ‘dropped for reasons of security’.96 In this instance, ‘his name, address and the nature of
his activities became known to Soviet authorities’.97 He was ‘disgruntled’ at being dropped and
was apparently seeking to sell his services to another intelligence agency.98 Consequently, the
British were warned not to employ him as this would risk attracting unwanted Soviet attention.99
Later that month, the CIC informed several American intelligence agencies that one Hans Helmut
Joachim Gast, a former member of the Waﬀen SS, had been ‘dismissed, with prejudice, for security
reasons’.100 Two months later, the British informed their American colleagues that Hans Moritz-
Middendorf had been ‘associated’ with British intelligence but dropped because his ‘activities
were compromised’ and that a former Abwehr oﬃcer from Bad Salzuﬂen, Hans Rohde had been ‘in
touch’ with them but found to be ‘very unreliable’.101 Also in 1952, several American intelligence
agencies were informed that ‘Hans Jahns’ had been ‘dismissed as an informant of this organiza-
tion’ for security reasons.102 He had been ‘double-dealing by working for a right wing German
party’ and had ‘also tried to make contact with other intelligence agencies’.103 All of these
individuals, like Slim, were dismissed because they had become security risks and/or could no
longer be controlled, not because of their activities under National Socialism. As Jahns’ dismissal
suggests, it was not permitted for an informant or agent of Anglo-American intelligence to be
actively engaged in extreme politics. This again suggests that the British and American intelli-
gence services sometimes found Nazi intellectuals – those capable of giving orders to execute
innocent people – to be more dangerous than those who would (and had) carried out the
executions.
Although the British and American intelligence services in Germany did share some information
concerning the ‘ex’ Nazis and even Nazi war criminals who they employed, the employment of such
individuals was a key source of rivalry and disagreement between the two organisations. Indeed,
they could not always agree on which Nazis could be controlled, nor did they always see eye to eye
on the best methods of control. Information concerning such employment was sometimes con-
cealed too. For example, part of the reason why the CIC continued to employ Klaus Barbie, the
Butcher of Lyon, despite him being wanted by the British, was because:
CIC rationalized that if unemployed, Barbie would renew his overtures to the British “who would ﬁnd out that CIC
had not turned him in or reported him regarding SELECTION BOARD because CIC was using him as an
informant”. CIC felt that such a revelation would be “a serious blow to CIC’s prestige in the eyes of the British”.104
This concern with damaged prestige does suggest that moral considerations could have been
implicit in this case. The British ID certainly did, at times, perceive the Nazi threat in occupied
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Germany to be more severe than their American colleagues.105 But the British had worked with Slim,
albeit hesitantly, and had a record of employing several war criminals themselves.106 It would make
little sense to oppose Barbie’s employment in moral terms whilst simultaneously working with other
Nazi war criminals. Perhaps the blow to CIC prestige in the eyes of the British would have came from
the fact that the British perceived Barbie to be uncontrollable and therefore a security risk. This
would be consistent with their attitude towards the American employment of other prominent ‘ex’
Nazis, particularly Reinhard Gehlen whose American backed intelligence organisation, codenamed
Operation Rusty, provided the foundations of the BND.107
Many British oﬃcials did not like Operation Rusty which enabled the employment of several
individuals with shady Nazi pasts.108 However, British objections did not stem primarily from the fact
that Rusty involved disreputable Nazis (though this was likely a reason for objection too). No, the
British were more concerned that Rusty sometimes operated under ‘ineﬀective, American direction
and control’.109 Apparently, partially owing to this, Rusty had been a ‘nuisance’ in the British Zone.110
Evidently, concerns about control and security were in this instance, again, more prominent than
issues of morality. Indeed, the second Chief of the British ID, Major-General Joseph Charles Haydon,
was worried that ‘quite apart from what the American authorities may wish or intend, there is a real
danger that RUSTY itself, to an extent not necessarily appreciated or known to the Americans, is
aiming at the ultimate domination of both the present Security Service and the future Intelligence
Service’.111 But such disagreements were not just manifested over insuﬃcient methods of control.
The two IDs sometimes also disagreed over which ‘ex’ Nazis could or should be controlled altogether.
For example, during discussions concerning intelligence sharing with SHAPE in 1951, the British High
Commissioner worried that without proper Anglo-American coordination, ‘ . . . the British might
describe a certain German ex-General as a ruﬃan while the U.S. might describe the same individual
as a hero’.112 This suggests, as Boghardt points out, that the employment of war criminals usually
occurred on an ad-hoc basis, subject to the opinions of individual intelligence oﬃcers managing
each case.113 Whether a hold was considered to be suﬃcient to control an individual, or whether it
was considered possible or desirable to control that individual at all, varied according to circum-
stance and the intelligence oﬃcers making the decision. Control itself became an important
commodity for both the British and American Intelligence Divisions as each sought to gain advanta-
geous inﬂuence in the future German intelligence services.114 However, by 1952, such competing
desires were eﬀectively managed by regular meetings of the Allied Directors of Intelligence.115
Indeed, by this point, the British had conceded that they would have to accept the employment of
characters disagreeable to them in the German intelligence services as to disapprove could hinder
Anglo-German intelligence liaison when the occupation ended.116
For reasons of security, prestige and trust, the British and American intelligence services did not
always reveal to each other which individuals they had employed as agents. The American ID even
kept entire intelligence organisations secret from their British counterparts, as was the case with the
Technical Intelligence Branch (TIB), which employed at least one former member of the Third Reich’s
Counter Intelligence Corps.117 This secrecy sometimes created problems. For example, in February
1949, British public safety oﬃcers apprehended an individual known as Issel who was wanted for war
crimes in Denmark.118 However:
While awaiting deportation from Hamburg on 24 February, British Intelligence prevailed upon by man named
GROPP (through British Public Safety) to withhold ISSEL from deportation since the two of them were working
for American Intelligence against Russians.119
Issel was probably employed by TIB.120 This issue was resolved via a conference with a British
Regional Intelligence Oﬃcer.121 It was agreed ‘that any eﬀort to salvage this character will evoke
questions by the Danish government which would be prejudicial to our intelligence eﬀorts’.122
Moreover, it was suggested that TIB be advised ‘that the case is hopeless, without jeopardizing the
entire organization’.123 The decision to abandon Issel may also have been aided by the fact that the
two individuals who informed the British that Issel was employed by American intelligence allegedly
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stated: ‘“That if the son-of-a-bitching Americans wouldn’t protect them they wouldn’t work for
them”’.124 Clearly such individuals could not be controlled and incidents such as this must not
have increased British conﬁdence in the American ability to control employees of similar organisa-
tions such as Rusty. Revealingly, it was suggested that ‘In view of the fact that Issel is wanted for a
crime against humanity some of his associates may also be in the same category’ but no further
action was to be taken unless speciﬁcally requested by higher headquarters.125 Again, the Nazi, and
probable war criminal backgrounds of these individuals was not a key factor determining their
employment or dismissal but rather whether they could be controlled and the threat which they
posed to the security of the occupation. This is partially evidenced by the fact that the British and
Americans at least discussed ‘salvaging’ Issel. In this instance, it was considered inadvisable to
protect Issel, as Barbie was protected, lest it reveal the existence of the organisation he worked
for, probably TIB.
Despite these examples, available evidence suggests that the employment of Nazi war criminals in
post-war Germany by the British and American intelligence services was not very common. It was an
exception, not the rule. This argument is supported by the initial reluctance of the British intelligence
services to employ any Germans at all, even those without a Nazi past. For example, it was only out of
necessity (presumably owing to manpower constraints) that Germans were employed in the British
Control Commission’s Mail and Messaging Centre as typists in 1947.126 As a Top Secret British report on
the ID organisation stated in 1947: ‘In the past, German personnel have not generally been employed
by Intelligence Division, except to a limited extent as press readers under British direction’.127 When
Germans were employed in such capacities, they were very carefully selected and monitored. This was
the case in 1946 when it was decided that ‘local Intelligence Teams would vet all Germans to be
employed by Censorship’.128 Moreover, whilst the Royal Navy in Germany were ‘obliged to employ an
increasing number of foreign nationals’ due to the ‘run-down’ of occupation forces, they made it clear
to the Chief of the British ID that they would, as a consequence, be increasing their security in case
some of these new employees turned out to be inﬁltration agents.129
American intelligence were more relaxed when it came to employing German personnel in some
capacities.130 But, when it came to ﬁeld intelligence work, they too, operated a vetting procedure for
all informants, German or not. For example, in 1946, when the CIC was questioned as to why it
employed Springer despite her Nazi background, it provided a revealing detailed overview of
informant recruitment processes:
For those informants who are controlled by the Production Group . . . The individual, after careful investigation in
the ﬁeld, is approached and is required to complete a fragebogen . . . the investigation and fragebogen are
forwarded to this oﬃce, where the fragebogen is studied, ﬁles of Central Registry are examined . . . SSU may be
requested for information . . . if no derogatory information is discovered and the Subject appears to be reliable, he
is assigned a code name . . . For those informants who are controlled by regions, sub-regions, and ﬁled oﬃces, the
individual acting as informant is taken upon local investigation and the Subject’s standing in the community . . . 131
Although the CIC clearly did thoroughly investigate the background of its employees and infor-
mants, it was not always able to do so. For example, in 1952, 66th CIC Detachment complained that:
Under the present troop allocation, this organization has developed a sizable backlog of personnel security
investigations due almost solely to personnel shortages. This represents a serious weakness in the security of
EUCOM units in that personnel for key security positions are not receiving their clearance with maximum speed,
and numerous employees are being hired without the proper security clearance or background investigation.132
This undoubtedly explains why some Nazi war criminals were hired with the British and American
intelligence services initially having no knowledge of their criminal Nazi pasts. But it is likely, given
the emphasis on control and security, that such individuals would have been hired regardless, even if
their pasts had been known from the outset.
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Conclusion
The evidence discussed in this article suggests that the British and American intelligence services
employed Nazi war criminals in post-war Germany as part of a wider strategy of control designed to
ensure the security of the occupation and pave the way for a future democratic Germany. Viewing
the employment of Nazi war criminals in this way has enabled this article to discuss and identify a
common link between several ﬁelds of intelligence work in Germany (including security, political,
scientiﬁc and technical), thereby providing a synthesis between the multitude of existing case
studies.
Focusing on security and control has also enabled this article to better explain the selective nature
of war criminal recruitment. Some Nazi war criminals were employed to arrest other Nazi war
criminals because the level of threat posed by such individuals was evaluated through the prism
of control and security, not morality. In some instances, Nazi ideologues capable of giving orders to
murder innocents were viewed as more of a threat than those who had carried out such orders in the
past. If the latter could be controlled, then such orders could be prevented. Nazi underground
movements threatened to make these orders possible again. Therefore, involvement in current Nazi
political activity was viewed as more of a threat to the mission of the British and American
Intelligence Divisions than the past murderous activities of war criminals. Hence informants found
engaging in extreme politics were dismissed.
But determining which war criminals and ‘ex’ Nazis could be controlled was subjective. Much
depended on the individual judgement of the oﬃcer making the decision to employ and the
personal past of the potential employee. Consequently, disagreements occurred within the British
and American intelligence services and between them. But these disagreements, again, largely
surrounded issues of control and security thus further demonstrating that the latter considerations
took precedence over moral concerns. This also helps to explain why, as Boghardt points out, little
ideological opposition was expressed over the gradual shift in emphasis from Nazi to Communist
intelligence targets.133 Both were evaluated in terms of security and control. The broad strategy of
control and the key missions of the Intelligence Divisions (securing the zones and building a
democratic Germany) remained the same although the level of threat posed to security and
democracy by the diﬀerent enemies shifted.
It is important to note that the evidence analysed in this article, in contrast to that analysed
by Wala, suggests that many British and American intelligence oﬃcers did not enjoy employing
or working with Nazi war criminals.134 This is evidenced by the reluctance of British intelligence
to employ any Germans at all, Slim’s comments about the CIC loving ‘the information and not
the informant’ and the British ID’s attempts to make Coleman end his friendship with Slim.
However, for reasons of security and control, both British and American intelligence oﬃcers felt
that in certain circumstances they had little choice but to employ such individuals. The
Intelligence Divisions did so in order to help achieve their missions, to secure their zones,
control the population and help build a democratic Germany. This can be viewed as a long-
term moral goal which was pursued by tactical, arguably immoral, concessions to considera-
tions of security and control.
Historians such as Boghardt have understandably remained ambivalent in their conclusions
concerning the morality and utility of employing Nazi war criminals.135 But some intelligence oﬃcers
who engaged in such activities seemed to have experienced little diﬃculty in drawing conclusions
concerning unpleasant work. As the former Chief of the British ID, Charles Haydon, reﬂected in a
lecture on intelligence operations given in the 1960s:
There is nothing particularly pleasant, or indeed ethical, in the idea of Intelligence operations . . . . Accept then – if
you like – that Intelligence is a distasteful business, but accept, also, that – like medicine – it has to be taken if the
body is to be kept healthy (and wise).136
12 L. DALY-GROVES
Notes
1. The National Archives, Kew (TNA), FO 1005/1744, Major-General John Sydney Lethbridge, Chief, Intelligence
Division to Major-General W.H.A. Bishop, Oﬃce of Deputy Military Governor, BAOR, Top Secret & Personal (22/04/
1947).
2. TNA, FO 1005/1744. See also Patricia Meehan, A Strange Enemy People: Germans Under The British, 1945–1950
(London: Peter Owen, 2001), pp. 69-87.
3. Scott Andrew Selby published the most detailed account of Ebeling’s career in The Axmann Conspiracy: The Nazi
Plan for a Fourth Reich and How the U.S. Army Defeated It (New York: Berkley, 2012) but he was unable to discover
how Ebeling died.
In 2005, an article in The Guardian by Ian Cobain discussed the death of Ebeling very brieﬂy although it lacked
important wider contextual analysis concerning his career, his recruitment and the reason for his death. See Ian
Cobain, ‘The interrogation camp that turned prisoners into living skeletons’, The Guardian (17/12/2005), https://
www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/dec/17/secondworldwar.topstories3 [Accessed: 15/12/2019].
4. Given as Abeling in Lethbridge’s letter but correctly identiﬁed as Günter Ebeling in other documents and by
Selby in Axmann, p. 195.
5. TNA, FO 1005/1744, Lethbridge to Bishop (22/04/1947).
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid. See also Selby, Axmann, pp. 194-196, 198, 199, 203, 209-211.
8. Selby, Axmann, pp. 11, 50, 60, 65, 103. See also TNA, FO 1005/1700, Intelligence Division (ID), Intelligence Review
Number 13, ‘Nursery’ (October 1946).




13. Ibid. Selection Board was the codename given to an Anglo-American anti-Nazi intelligence operation which was
directed against several underground groups that showed alarming signs of mergence. Undertaken along
similar lines to Nursery but exceeding the scope of the latter, it began in 1946 and concluded, in late
February 1947, with mass arrests in the British and American Zones. See Perry Biddiscombe, ‘Operation
Selection Board: The Growth and Suppression of the Neo-Nazi ‘Deutsche Revolution’ 1945–47’, Intelligence
and National Security, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1996), pp. 59-77. See also Richard J.
Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London: John Murray, 2002), p. 183;
Luke Daly-Groves, ‘The Intelligence Division in Occupied Germany: The Untold Story of Britain’s Largest Secret
Intelligence Organisation’, Journal of Intelligence History, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2019), p. 98.






20. Ibid. The fact that Lethbridge took this step suggests that the threats posed by Selection Board were not as
exaggerated as Aldrich implies in Hidden Hand, p. 183.
21. TNA, FO 1005/1744, ‘Ebeling (SLIM): Summary of attached statements’ (1947). See also ‘Telephone Message:
Keble/Stephens’ (20/01/1947).
22. TNA, FO 1005/1744, R.W.G. Stephens, DIC 74 to C.M. Keble, HQ ID, ‘Ludwell/Ebeling’ (23/01/1947).
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid. See also ‘Ebeling (SLIM): Summary of attached statements’ (1947).
25. TNA, FO 1005/1744, ‘Ebeling (SLIM): Summary of attached statements’ (1947).
26. According to Ian Cobain, by 2005 the wooden cross had been replaced by a gravestone, but it still bears the
name John X White and Slim presumably still lies beneath. See Cobain, ‘living skeletons’.
27. Linda Hunt, ‘U.S. coverup of Nazi scientists’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 41, No. 4 (1985), p. 24.
28. Ibid.
29. Michael Salter, ‘The Prosecution of Nazi War Criminals and the OSS: The Need For a New Research Agenda’,
Journal of Intelligence History, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2002), p. 77.
30. Aldrich, Hidden Hand, pp. 183-184. See also Stephen Tyas, ‘Ghosts From The Past. Nazi War Criminals Recruited
By Great Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service’, Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies, Vol. 6, No.
1 (2012), p. 63.
31. For example see ‘Himmler-Tochter arbeitete für Geheimdienst BND’, Bild (28/06/2018), https://www.bild.de/bild-
plus/news/inland/heinrich-himmler/himmler-tochter-arbeitete-fuer-bnd-56155796,view=conversionToLogin.
bild.html [Accessed: 08/05/2019]. See also Abby Young-Powell, ‘German spy agency acknowledges employing
Himmler's daughter in the 1960s’, The Telegraph (29/06/2018), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/06/29/
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 13
german-spy-agency-acknowledges-employing-himmlers-daughter-1960s/ [Accessed: 08/05/2019]; ‘SS chief
Himmler’s daughter worked for German spy agency’, The Times of Israel (29/06/2018), https://www.timesoﬁs
rael.com/ss-chief-himmlers-daughter-worked-for-german-spy-agency/ [Accessed: 08/05/2019].
32. David Cesarani, Justice Delayed: How Britain Became A Refuge for Nazi War Criminals (London: Mandarin
Paperbacks, 1992), pp. 3-5, 134.
33. Ibid, pp. 135-137, 143, 145, 157.
34. Ibid, p. 147.
35. Ibid, p. 161.
36. Thomas Boghardt, ‘America’s Secret Vanguard: US Army Intelligence Operations in Germany, 1944–47’ Studies in
Intelligence, Vol. 57, No. 2 (2013), pp. 1-18. See also Selby, Axmann; Daly-Groves, ‘Intelligence Division’.
37. Thomas Boghardt, ‘Dirty Work? The Use of Nazi Informants by U.S. Army Intelligence in Postwar Europe’, The
Journal of Military History, Vol. 79, No. 2 (2015), p. 422.
38. Ibid. See also Perry Biddiscombe, ‘The Problem with Glass Houses: The Soviet Recruitment and Deployment of SS
Men as Spies and Saboteurs’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2000), pp. 131-145; Salter, ‘Nazi War
Criminals’; Tyas, ‘Nazi War Criminals’; Stephen Tyas, ‘Smoke and Mirrors: The German Foreign Intelligence
Service’s Release of Names of Former Nazi Employees’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2011),
pp. 290–299; Michael Wala, ‘Stay-behind operations, former members of SS and Wehrmacht, and American
intelligence services in early Cold War Germany’, Journal of Intelligence History, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2016), pp. 71–79;
Richard Breitman, Robert Wolfe, Norman J. W. Goda and Timothy Naftali, U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Christopher Simpson, Blowback: America's Recruitment of Nazis
and Its Eﬀects on the Cold War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988).
39. Tyas, ‘Nazi War Criminals’. See also Wala, ‘American intelligence services’.
40. On CIA coordination see Boghardt, ‘Nazi Informants’, p. 395. On MI6 coordination see Daly-Groves, ‘Intelligence
Division’, pp. 88-89, 104-105.
41. Daly-Groves, ‘Intelligence Division’, pp. 87-89.
42. Paul Maddrell, Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945–1961 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006), pp. 1, 7, 32-33. See also Cesarani, Justice Delayed, p. 151.
43. Michael Wala, ‘The Value of Knowledge: Western Intelligence Agencies and Former Members of the SS, Gestapo
and Wehrmacht during the Early Cold War’ in Camilo Erlichman and Christopher Knowles (eds), Transforming
Occupation in the Western Zones of Germany: Politics, Everyday Life and Social Interactions, 1945-55 (London:
Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), pp. 271-283.
44. Wala, ‘Western Intelligence Agencies’, pp. 272-273, 278-279. See also Maddrell, Spying on Science, pp. 129-131.
45. Boghardt, ‘Nazi Informants’, p. 390.
46. Ibid, p. 403.
47. Giles MacDonogh, After the Reich: From the Fall of Vienna to the Berlin Airlift (London: John Murray, 2007), p. 7. See
also Peter Wende, A History of Germany (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 163; Sabine Lee, Victory in
Europe: Britain and Germany Since 1945 (London: Longman, 2001), p. 16.
48. Perry Biddiscombe, The Denaziﬁcation of Germany: A History, 1945-1950 (Gloucestershire: Tempus, 2007), pp. 66,
76, 107.
49. Aldrich, Hidden, p. 182; Daly-Groves, ‘Intelligence Division’, pp. 87-88.
50. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (NARA II), RG 319, ZZ6, Box 13, CIC to CIB,
‘CIC Controlled Informants’ (18/06/1946).
51. NARA II, RG 319, ZZ6, Box 12, Special Investigation Squad, CIC Detachment 970, USFET, ‘Various Statements
made by SLIM’ (01/05/1946).
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid. In particular, Slim could not convince Axmann to focus his eﬀorts solely against the Russians.
55. Ibid.
56. TNA, FO 1005/1744, Lethbridge to Bishop (22/04/1947).
57. NARA II, RG 319, ZZ6, Box 12, Special Investigation Squad, CIC Detachment 970, USFET, ‘Various Statements
made by SLIM’ (01/05/1946).
58. Selby, Axmann, pp. 196, 198, 203, 208-210.
59. TNA, FO 1005/1744, Lethbridge to Bishop (22/04/1947).
60. NARA II, RG 549, A148, Box 728, 563465, ‘Present Status Of The Nazi Threat’ (28/02/1947).
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. The enduring fear of a merging of ‘extreme-right’ groups can be identiﬁed in NARA II, RG 549, A12027, Box 132, J.
T. Marshall, Chief S&S Section, HQ ID USAREUR to CO 66th CIC Det, ‘Freikorps Deutschland’ (14/08/1952).
64. Slim’s threat can be found in NARA II, RG 319, ZZ6, Box 12, Special Investigation Squad, CIC Detachment 970,
USFET, ‘Various Statements made by SLIM’ (01/05/1946). See also in this box information concerning Operation
Red Lilac which involved the investigation of a group of ‘ex’ Nazis suspected in 1946 of working for Russian
14 L. DALY-GROVES
Intelligence, see ‘Annexe to Intelligence Division Summary No 7’ (15/10/1946). Walter Schellenberg even
believed that Heinrich Müller, head of the Gestapo, may have worked with the Russians, see TNA, KV 2/2655,
‘Translation of Statement’ (20/08/1945). The Intelligence Divisions were aware that former SS oﬃcers were
working for ‘Soviet Intelligence’ see NARA II, RG 549, A1 48, Box 760, 563465, ABr to BLO, ‘Erwin Friesecke and
Georg Botzenhardt’ (19/11/1951). They also dealt with individuals such as Hans Heinrich who was ‘involved in
neo-Nazi move and Commie’ see NARA II, RG 549, A12027, Box 133, HQ ID USAREUR to CO 66th CIC Det, ‘Hans
Heinrich’ (06/11/1952). Slim’s threat may have further worried the CIC because despite being on the frontline of
the Cold War, British and American intelligence oﬃcers in Germany struggled greatly during the early years of
occupation to penetrate the Soviet Union meaning that they could ill aﬀord to lose intelligence assets to the
Soviets. See Maddrell, Spying on Science, pp. 11-14, 16.
65. NARA II, RG 319, ZZ6, Box 12, Draft Statement For Press Conference To Be Held By Chief, Intelligence Division In
The Zeco Area On ‘D’ Day (Undated, Likely 1947).
66. NARA II, RG 319, ZZ6, Box 12, Untitled statement ﬁled alongside the above.
67. Ibid.
68. The Werewolves were a hastily organised and poorly coordinated violent Nazi resistance movement directed by
Heinrich Himmler in the closing months of the Second World War. Arguably, their most notable act was the
assassination, on 25 March 1945, of Franz Oppenhoﬀ, the American appointed Mayor of Aachen. See Frederick
Taylor, Exorcising Hitler: The Occupation and Denaziﬁcation of Germany (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), pp. 22-46. As
Aldrich notes, Werwolf propaganda inspired real fear in Allied military and intelligence oﬃcials of ‘an enormous
Nazi resistance movement’ which never materialised, see Hidden Hand, pp. 182-183.
69. Taylor, Occupation and Denaziﬁcation, pp. 253-255. See also Biddiscombe, Denaziﬁcation, pp. 33, 36, 39-40.
70. TNA, FO 1005/1700, Intelligence Division CCG(BE), Review, No. 11 (August 1946).
71. TNA, FO 1005/1700, Intelligence Bureau CCG(BE), Review, No. 2 (26/12/1945).
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Biddiscombe, Denaziﬁcation, p. 107.
75. TNA, FO 1038/105, Air Division, Berlin, ‘Situation Report On The Present Work And Future Commitments Of A.D.I.
(K).’, Appendix I (Undated, Likely 1946).
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid, Appendix II.
78. Ibid.
79. TNA, WO 106/4453, Kirkpatrick, SHAEF to Foreign Oﬃce (26/06/1945). Ivone Kirkpatrick was then acting as British
Political Adviser to General Eisenhower in Frankfurt. He later became the British High Commissioner for Germany
(1950-1953). See Ivone Kirkpatrick, The Inner Circle (London: Macmillan, 1959), pp. 190, 220.




84. TNA, FO 1032/190, JIC (CCG), 8th Meeting Minutes (1945).
85. Ibid.
86. TNA, FO 1032/1231A, Evans, STIB, ‘Operation Match Box’ (08/08/1947).
87. Maddrell, Spying on Science, pp. 32-33.
88. TNA, FO 936/344, Establishments Branch, Berlin to Foreign Oﬃce (German Section), Norfolk House,
‘Establishments Board Meeting No. 87’ (11/11/1947). See also P.T. Lyver, ‘Intelligence Division’ (28/11/1947).
89. TNA, FO 1013/364, Lethbridge, HQ ID to W.H.A. Bishop, Oﬃce of the DMG (25/09/1947).
90. NARA II, RG 319, ZZ6, Box 13, B.B. McMahon to Oﬃce of the Director of Information Control, ‘Mrs. Hildegard
Springer’ (20/05/1946).
91. NARA II, RG 319, ZZ6, Box 13, CIC to CIB, ‘CIC Controlled Informants’ (18/06/1946).
92. NARA II, RG 549, A1 2027, Box 126, Chief S&T Section, HQ ID USAREUR to CO 7780 MID (29/12/1952).
93. NARA II, RG 549, A148, Box 753, 563465, HQ ID to Chief, Combined Travel Board, US Element, ‘Michahelles, Alfred
Hermann’ (03/04/1951).
94. NARA II, RG 549, A148, Box 753, 563465, Harry R. Smith, Chief Security Section, ID EUCOM to Chief Combined
Travel Board, US Element, ‘Travel Restriction List’ (24/04/1951). See also Harry R. Smith. Chief Security Section, ID
EUCOM to Combined Travel Board, US Element, ‘Ruperti, Hans’ (20/12/1951).
95. NARA II, RG 549, A148, Box 753, 563465, Ritchie Garrison, Executive Opns Br, ID EUCOM to Chief, CTB, US Element,
‘Kieﬀer, Bernhard A.’ (28/12/1951).
96. NARA II, RG 549, A12027, Box 132, ID to BLO, ‘Herbert Edler’ (08/01/1952). It is likely that Edler was employed by
DAD, a Germany-based CIA organisation.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 15
99. Ibid.
100. NARA II, RG 549, A12027, Box 124, HQ 66 CIC Det EUCOM, ‘GAST, Hans Helmut Joachim’ (31/01/1952).
101. NARA II, RG 549, A1 2027, Box 135, HQ ID EUCOM to CO 66 CIC Det (18/03/1952).
102. NARA II, RG 549, A1 2027, Box 124, 66 CIC Det, EUCOM, ‘Jahns, Hans’ (11/02/1952).
103. Ibid.
104. NARA II, RG 59, ZZ1004, Box 31, 26169009, Oﬃce of the Historian, Bureau of Public Aﬀairs, ‘The Relationship of
Klaus Barbie To The U.S. Government’ (18/03/1983).
105. NARA II, RG 549, A12027, Box 132, J.T. Marshall, Chief S&S Section, HQ ID USAREUR to CO 66th CIC Det, ‘Freikorps
Deutschland’ (14/08/1952). See also NARA II, RG 549, A12027, Box 135, Marshall, Chief S&S, HQ ID EUCOM to
ACoS, G-2, Washington D.C., ‘Extreme Nationalists and Veterans’ (09/05/1952).
106. Tyas, ‘Nazi War Criminals’, pp. 66, 68-71, 73.
107. Daly-Groves, ‘Intelligence Division’, p. 104.
108. Ibid, p. 104. See also Jens Wegener, ‘Shaping Germany’s Post-War Intelligence Service: The Gehlen Organization,
the U.S. Army, and Central Intelligence, 1945–1949’, Journal of Intelligence History. Vol. 7, No. 1 (2007), p. 42; Tyas,
‘German Foreign Intelligence’, pp. 293, 295.
109. TNA, FO 371/85353, Major-General J.C. Haydon, Chief, ID, Herford, Top Secret Personal Letter to Dugold Malcolm,
The Chancery, Oﬃce of the UK High Commissioner, Wahnerheide (08/08/1950).
110. TNA, FO 371/85353, Haydon, Chief ID, Herford, ‘Comments By Chief Intelligence Division’ (08/08/1950).
111. Ibid.
112. TNA, FO 1035/77, 'Extract From Minutes Of The 10th H.C.M.C.' (26/10/1951).
113. Boghardt, ‘Nazi Informants’ p. 400.
114. On British inﬂuence with the BfV see Daly-Groves, ‘Intelligence Division’, p. 105. On America competing for
inﬂuence see NARA II, RG 549, A1 48, Box 762, 563465, W.R. Philp, Chief Opns Branch, HQ ID EUCOM to Director of
Intelligence, US High Commissioner (13/03/1951). See also competition for control of the LfV between American
intelligence organisations in NARA II, RG 549, A148, Box 761, 563465, Mark McClure, Director of Intelligence to L.
K. Truscott Jr., ‘Release of Information to the BfV and LfV’ (20/12/1951).
115. NARA II, RG 549, A12027, Box 134, Twenty-Fourth Meeting of The Allied Directors Of Intelligence (18/02/1952).
116. Ibid.
117. For secrecy from the British see NARA II, RG 549, A1 48, Box 740, 563465, William E. Hall, Director of Intelligence,
‘Guide to ID/EUCOM on Exchange of Intelligence Information with the British’ (07/10/1949). On German CIC
employee see NARA II, RG 549, A12027, Box 134, HQ ID USAREUR to ACoS, G-2 Intelligence, Department of the
Army, Washington (22/08/1952).
118. NARA II, RG 549, A1-8, Box 360, 562475, Top Secret Teleconference, ‘Intelligence Matters’ (28/02/1949).
119. Ibid.






126. TNA, FO 1038/193, Secretariat, HQ, CCG(BE), ‘Security of Signals’ (01/03/1947).
127. FOI, FO 1005/1731, ‘Establishment Investigation Report No. 101, Intelligence Division’, Top Secret (1947).
Redacted copy in author’s possession following FOI request (Ref: 0531–17) completed on July 28, 2017.
128. TNA, FO 1047/7, Meeting Minutes, HQ ID, ‘Reorganisation of Censorship’ (04/10/1946).
129. TNA, FO 1038/193, Flag Oﬃcer Commanding British Naval Forces, Germany, Hamburg, ‘Physical Security of
Cyphers’ (08/07/1947).
130. TNA, FO 1047/7, Meeting Minutes, HQ ID, ‘Reorganisation of Censorship’ (04/10/1946).
131. NARA II, RG 319, ZZ6, Box 13, CIC to CIB, ‘CIC Controlled Informants’ (18/06/1946).
132. NARA II, RG 549, A12027, Box 133, HQ 66 CIC Det EUCOM, ‘Justiﬁcation For Military Augmentation’ (11/01/1952).
133. Boghardt, ‘Nazi Informants’, pp. 397-398.
134. Wala, ‘American intelligence services’, p. 78.
135. Boghardt, ‘Nazi Informants’, p. 422.
136. Imperial War Museum (IWM), Haydon Private Papers, ‘Intelligence Operations in a Free Society’, Notes for Lecture
to Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine, USA, 1962 or 1963.
Acknowledgements
This article has beneﬁtted from the help and support of my supervisors Professor Simon Ball and Dr Elisabeth Leake,
Professor Mark Phythian and the anonymous reviewers of Intelligence and National Security, my friends, colleagues and
organisers of the White Rose IHIR Seminar Series, Dr Alexander Shaw and Scott Ramsay, those who attended and asked
16 L. DALY-GROVES
questions including Dr Adam Richardson, Francesca Morphakis and Emma Chippendale, the archivists at NARA II, Paul
Brown and Eric S. Van Slander, their counterparts at TNA in Kew, the formidable reviewing talents of Guy Walters, my
ﬁancée Jessica who has photographed thousands of ﬁles, the Imperial War Museums, WRoCAH, the AHRC and the
School of History at the University of Leeds.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Luke Daly-Groves is a historian and author of Hitler’s Death: The Case Against Conspiracy. He is currently studying for a
PhD at the University of Leeds having won an AHRC WRoCAH studentship. His doctoral research analyses Anglo-
American intelligence relations in occupied Germany. He has written for The New Statesman, The American, The Journal





Imperial War Museum, London
The Private Papers of Major-General Joseph Charles Haydon.














National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland
RG 319, ZZ6, Box 12.
RG 319, ZZ6, Box 13.
RG 549, A12027, Box 124.
RG 549, A12027, Box 126.
RG 549, A12027, Box 132.
RG 549, A12027, Box 133.
RG 549, A12027, Box 134.
RG 549, A12027, Box 135.
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 17
RG 549, A148, Box 728, 563465.
RG 549, A148, Box 740, 563465.
RG 549, A148, Box 753, 563465.
RG 549, A148, Box 760, 563465.
RG 549, A148, Box 761, 563465.
RG 549, A148, Box 762, 563465.
RG 549, A1-8, Box 360, 562475.
RG 59, ZZ1004, Box 31, 26169009.
Secondary sources
Articles
Biddiscombe, P. “Operation Selection Board: The Growth and Suppression of the Neo-Nazi ‘deutsche Revolution’ 1945–
47.” Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 1 (1996): 59–77. doi:10.1080/02684529608432343.
Biddiscombe, P. “The Problem with Glass Houses: The Soviet Recruitment and Deployment of SS Men as Spies and
Saboteurs.” Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 3 (2000): 131–145. doi:10.1080/02684520008432620.
Boghardt, T. “America’s Secret Vanguard: US Army Intelligence Operations in Germany, 1944–47.” Studies in Intelligence
57, no. 2 (2013): 1–18.
Boghardt, T. “Dirty Work? the Use of Nazi Informants by U.S. Army Intelligence in Postwar Europe.” The Journal of Military
History 79, no. 2 (2015): 387–422.
Daly-Groves, L. “The Intelligence Division in Occupied Germany: The Untold Story of Britain’s Largest Secret Intelligence
Organisation.” Journal of Intelligence History 18, no. 1 (2019): 86–107. doi:10.1080/16161262.2018.1545824.
Hunt, L. “U.S. Coverup of Nazi Scientists.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 41, no. 4 (1985): 16–24. doi:10.1080/
00963402.1985.11455944.
Salter, M. “The Prosecution of Nazi War Criminals and the OSS: The Need for a New Research Agenda.” Journal of
Intelligence History 2, no. 1 (2002): 77–119. doi:10.1080/16161262.2002.10555063.
Tyas, S. “Ghosts From The Past. Nazi War Criminals Recruited By Great Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service.” Journal for
Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies 6, no. 1 (2012): 62–79.
Tyas, S. “Smoke and Mirrors: The German Foreign Intelligence Service’s Release of Names of Former Nazi Employees.”
Holocaust and Genocide Studies 25, no. 2 (2011): 290–299. doi:10.1093/hgs/dcr037.
Wala, M. “Stay-behind Operations, Former Members of SS and Wehrmacht, and American Intelligence Services in Early
Cold War Germany.” Journal of Intelligence History 15, no. 2 (2016): 71–79. doi:10.1080/16161262.2016.1181400.
Wegener, J. “Shaping Germany’s Post-War Intelligence Service: The Gehlen Organization, the U.S. Army, and Central
Intelligence, 1945–1949.” Journal of Intelligence History 7, no. 1 (2007): 41–59. doi:10.1080/16161262.2007.10555138.
Books
Aldrich, R. J. The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence. London: John Murray, 2002.
Biddiscombe, P. The Denaziﬁcation of Germany: A History, 1945–1950. Gloucestershire: Tempus, 2007.
Breitman, R., R. Wolfe, N. J. W. Goda, and N. Timothy. U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005.
Camilo, E., and C. Knowles, eds. Transforming Occupation in the Western Zones of Germany: Politics, Everyday Life and
Social Interactions, 1945–55. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018.
Cesarani, D. Justice Delayed: How Britain Became A Refuge for Nazi War Criminals. London: Mandarin Paperbacks, 1992.
Kirkpatrick, I. The Inner Circle. London: Macmillan, 1959.
Lee, S. Victory in Europe: Britain and Germany since 1945. London: Longman, 2001.
MacDonogh, G. After the Reich: From the Fall of Vienna to the Berlin Airlift. London: John Murray, 2007.
Maddrell, P. Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945–1961. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Meehan, P. A Strange Enemy People: Germans Under The British, 1945–1950. London: Peter Owen, 2001.
Selby, S. A. The Axmann Conspiracy: The Nazi Plan for a Fourth Reich and How the U.S. Army Defeated It. New York: Berkley,
2012.
Simpson, C. Blowback: America’s Recruitment of Nazis and Its Eﬀects on the Cold War. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
1988.
Taylor, F. Exorcising Hitler: The Occupation and Denaziﬁcation of Germany. London: Bloomsbury, 2012.
Wende, P. A History of Germany. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
18 L. DALY-GROVES
Websites
“Himmler-Tochter Arbeitete Für Geheimdienst BND.” Bild, June 28, 2018. Accessed May 8, 2019. https://www.bild.de/
bild-plus/news/inland/heinrich-himmler/himmler-tochter-arbeitete-fuer-bnd-56155796,view=conversionToLogin.
bild.html
“SS Chief Himmler’s Daughter Worked for German Spy Agency.” The Times of Israel, June 29, 2018. Accessed May 8, 2019.
https://www.timesoﬁsrael.com/ss-chief-himmlers-daughter-worked-for-german-spy-agency/
Cobain, Ian. ‘The interrogation camp that turned prisoners into living skeletons’. The Guardian, December 17, 2005.
Accessed December 15, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/dec/17/secondworldwar.topstories3
Young-Powell, A. “German Spy Agency Acknowledges Employing Himmler’s Daughter in the 1960s.” The Telegraph,
June 29, 2018. Accessed May 8, 2019. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/06/29/german-spy-agency-acknowl
edges-employing-himmlers-daughter-1960s/
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 19
